When the news broke in 2019 that British Ambassador to the United States Kim Darroch had made disparaging remarks about then US President Donald Trump, much of the public was shocked. While the unvarnished language was half-heartedly defended as being part of the job, many people were nevertheless unaccustomed to hearing a British diplomat be so candid regarding an American president. However, while it is rare that these types of comments see the light of day, it is not new. The Winston Churchill/Dwight D. Eisenhower relationship, seen at the time as two friends working closely for the benefit of the west, can be a confusing mess when reading how they spoke about one another in private.
In 1953, Churchill was in his second stint as prime minister of the United Kingdom. Believing that the Republicans’ two decades out of leadership in the United States had left them lacking the experience to deal with the realities of the Cold War, Churchill was understandably unenthused by the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the nation’s highest office. Publicly, the prime minister appeared to be full of respect and admiration for Eisenhower. His private opinion, however, was encapsulated by his comment to an assistant and sculptor Oscar Nemon at Chequers, when, upon hearing of Eisenhower’s election, that he now had a “fish that [could] talk…with an American accent” – a comment Nemon recorded in his unpublished memoirs. Churchill also noted that the new American president struck him as “a genial and dynamic mediocrity…forceful but a trifle naïve.” Underestimating Eisenhower, Churchill believed that their existing relationship would allow Britain, and Churchill in particular, to “act as a restraining influence on America.”
The publisher of Time magazine and one time staff officer at Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s headquarters, Ralph Ingersoll, recorded Churchill’s assessment of Eisenhower as being “neither bold nor decisive, and…neither a leader nor a general” came as a result of the early stages of American involvement in the Second World War. Churchill thought so little of Eisenhower’s abilities at the time that he dispatched Harold Macmillan to act as the general’s political advisor in dealing with the intricacies of international alliances. Yet, the two had worked closely during the war and had seemingly developed a working relationship that had at least some semblance of grudgingly growing respect.
For his part, Eisenhower, new to his position of presidential power, brimmed with confidence. The American people loved him for winning the war in Europe, so he was drafted into running for office by a raft of supporters from both political parties. Upon his election, he was happy to partner up, but just as happy to chart his own course. Eisenhower nurtured no animus towards Churchill. Upon taking office, he told the prime minister that he hoped they could continue to have a personal correspondence in addition to the formal government to government exchanges. The new president’s idea was that the two men could use their personal relationship to clarify intentions and explain their decisions without the message being muddled by diplomatic nuance or newspaper headlines. For a man entering his seventy-ninth year, leading a country of declining status, and hoping to “influence” the new American president, this was music to Churchill’s ears.
As president, Eisenhower had to deal with Churchill’s failing health. According to cabinet notes, despite his fondness for Churchill, the president did not look forward to meeting with the prime minister because he was deaf and couldn’t stay awake. Nevertheless, Eisenhower recognized that Churchill still had the international prestige needed for the Western powers to get things done on the world stage. Some historians believe that when Eisenhower became President of the United States he felt that Churchill had passed his prime and should turn power over to his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. However, this did not constitute a lack of respect. While he was frustrated by Churchill's slower speech and inability to hear, Eisenhower still confided in him in letter after letter. His respect for Churchill as a man and leader was something that never diminished, even as he screamed over the phone in an attempt to get the aged prime minister to hear him.
Despite his public praise for Churchill, in private, Eisenhower seems to have been ambivalent towards Churchill and Britain. His understanding of the importance of shared heritage and values did not change his belief that Churchill and Eden were refusing to face reality about Britain's place in the world. To Eisenhower, the British position in global politics was clear – it was on the decline. He also understood the value Churchill and the British Empire offered in the fight against communist aggression and in keeping the peace, and he worked to maintain the US/UK friendship accordingly. Churchill’s post-Second World War record alludes to his grudging understanding of the new realities of the post-war world – one where he clearly understood that Britain could not keep its empire. Additionally, Churchill was astute enough to realize that if Britain were to maintain its position at or near the apex of world power, it could only do so by capitalizing on its special relationship with the United States.
Where US and British interests were to come into conflict was anyone’s guess at the time. The two powers were, seemingly, on the same side of many issues but international relations are convoluted at the best of times. Britain's reliance on American support coupled with its desire to co-opt American power were highlighted when Churchill attempted to tie British support for ending the Korean War to U.S. support of British interests in Egypt. Despite the prime minister’s reasoning, Eisenhower rejected the proposal. Another issue that would be a thorn of contention between Eisenhower and Churchill was Britain’s empire itself. As president, Eisenhower was clear that the United States would not support British colonialism or its fight to retain its empire. This had less to do with the morality of colonialism than with the president’s belief that colonialism weakened the West’s position in the fight against communism.
At the height of his political powers Churchill might have been able to out-politic Eisenhower, but by the time the two were the leaders of their respective countries he, like Britain, was no longer near the lofty heights of years past. From 1953 to 1955, these men maneuvered their way through some of the confrontation with communism. It is tempting to focus solely on events such as Korea, Egypt, and German rearmament during this time. It is more important, though, to understand that despite public and private utterances about one another, the president and prime minister consulted each other, were willing to work together, and even flattered each other when they thought it would produce desired results. It would seem that many of the negative comments made were more about frustrations than personal animus, and that it was possible for both Eisenhower and Churchill to have respect for one another while also being aware of each other’s shortcomings.
This piece is part of a Broadsides series on Britain and the US Presidency, you can read the rest of the series at the links below.
"Britain's Entangled Connections with the US Presidency" by Amanda Perry
"A Fictional Special Relationship" by Michelle Tusan
"London and the Making of Herbert Hoover" by Tammy Proctor
"In the Graveyard of Empires: The United States, Britain and the Afghan War" by Sarah Burns
“Washington, US Revolution, and the British Atlantic” by Troy Bickham
Dr. Olmstead is a historian for Sandia National Laboratories, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Armed Services Institute at Thomas University, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Peace & Security, Coventry University, UK. His most recent books include: From Nuclear Weapons to Global Security: 75 Years of Research and Development at Sandia National Laboratories (2024), Britain in the Islamic World: Imperial and Post-Imperial Connections (2019), The United States’ Entry into the First World War: The Role of British and German Diplomacy (2018).
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